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Justice Tobriner and the Tolerance of
Evolving Lifestyles: Adapting the Law
to Social Change
By MicHAEL A. WL&EmsEN*
The sixteen years of Justice Tobriner's tenure on the California
Supreme Court have witnessed the rise and evolution of new, unortho-
dox styles of living and relating to others. Those years have seen also
a gradual change in public attitudes toward acceptance of many such
alternative lifestyles. In this article, I will briefly review certain of
the more prominent changes in social behavior and attitudes during
this period and then focus more directly on the response of Justice
Tobriner and the California Supreme Court to those changes.'
One principal area of change has concerned popular attitudes
toward sexual relationships and behavior. The traditional marital
* A.B.; MA., 1959; LL.B. 1962, Stanford University. Member, California Bar.
1. I have had the honor and the pleasure of serving as research assistant to
Justice Tobriner since June of 1969. This opportunity to observe his day-to-day work
and that of the other justices of the California Supreme Court affords a different per-
spective of the accomplishments of Justice Tobriner than could be gleaned merely by
reading his published opinions. For example, approximately half of the justices' time
is spent in careful study of the petitions for hearing and of the analysis of those peti-
tions prepared by the court staff. Among the most important achievements of Justice
Tobriner has been his success in persuading the court to hear difficult cases which
required the reconsideration of previously settled principles and which involved the
evaluation of innovative theories. A court, forever burdened with more work than
it can conveniently handle, might otherwise be disposed to reject such cases.
When the court grants a hearing, the choice of a justice to write the majority
opinion depends on a variety of factors, including the happenstance of which justice's
staff prepared the initial analysis of the petition for hearing and the necessity of equal-
izing the workload of the justices. Thus on occasion a justice who is the leading ad-
vocate of the majority position may not write the opinion. Consequently, any attempt
to assess the work of a justice only by examination of his published opinions is a very
incomplete analysis. The effect of such a limited perspective is particularly glaring
for Justice Tobriner in view of the time, energy, and devotion he pours into the task
of determining which cases should come before the court for hearing. Although the
content of judicial conferences and internal memoranda is confidential, I will attempt
to reveal a wider perspective by noting the votes of the justices, in particular those
of Justice Tobriner, in granting or denying certain petitions for hearing. These votes
sometimes offer a basis for inferring a justice's view on the issues which the court de-
clined to resolve by formal opinion.
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stereotype of a male breadwinner and a female homemaker has faced
increasing challenge from advocates of a relationship based upon new
concepts of sexual equality. Many people have rejected the marriage
relationship. The number of unmarried couples living together in-
creased eightfold in the 1960's,2 and there are no signs that this trend
will reverse itself. Consequently, the opprobrium that traditionally
attached to such "illicit" relationships has diminished. At the same
time certain common, yet traditionally disapproved, sexual practices
have become increasingly tolerated. In 1977 only a dwindling mi-
nority still believe that heterosexual oral intercourse, anal intercourse,
premarital sex, or extramarital sex ought to be punished as criminal
conduct. To a lesser degree, public disapproval of homosexual con-
duct seems to have diminished, and attitudes toward long term homo-
sexual relationships have broadened with the increasing visibility of
the gay community.
Equally dramatic changes have occurred in public attitudes to-
ward sexually oriented literature and other forms of expression. Ac-
cepted standards of candor in print have shifted radically. In 1961
the works of D. H. Lawrence and Henry Miller were considered
questionable and were banned in many localities. Ten years later
those writings and others of equal candor are generally available. A
similar development has shaped the theatre and the cinema. The tide
may now have turned in a surge of public reaction against the extremes
of pornography, but this apparent retreat has so far erased little of
the advance of the preceding decade.
Public attitudes toward drugs and particularly toward marijuana
have been affected by the great increase in their use by persons of
all social strata. By mid-1970 marijuana had moved a great distance
toward complete social acceptability, although there had been no
corresponding relaxation in attitudes toward addictive drugs.
All of these social changes have taken place against a background
of laws and judicial decisions dating from an earlier era. Such laws
and decisions, if applied without recognition of the changes in social at-
titudes and behavior, may suppress the normal and desirable evolution
of society and harshly punish those who participate in that evolution.
Examples are easy to find. In California in 1968, for example, laws
that made it possible to punish possession of marijuana as a felony,3
2. See, e.g., Note, In re Cary: A Judicial Recognition of Illicit Cohabitation, 25
HAST. L.J. 1226 (1974).
3. See former CAL. HEALTR & SAFETY CODE § 11530 (West 1970) (repealed
1972).
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that treated casual nudity as a sex crime,4 that threatened to jail as a
felon any homosexual who expressed his sexual needs in private and
with a consenting partner5 and to bar him from many occupations, and
that almost unconsciously presumed the weakness and inferiority of
women.7 Enforcement of such laws or decisions, which had become
radically inconsistent with social attitudes, appeared a form of arbitrary
injustice.
With that introduction, I come to the thesis of this article: to
demonstrate how the California Supreme Court, and Justice Tobriner
in particular, utilized the cases coming before the court to adapt legal
principles to changing social conditions and to give expression to a
philosophy of individual freedom and tolerance. A caveat is necessary
here; my discussion of the work of the courts in adapting the law to
social change is also a discussion of the limitations of the judicial
process in achieving that end. For example, in three major areas of
controversy, marijuana, unorthodox sexual practices, and discrimina-
tion against women in domestic relations law, the ultimate reconcilia-
tion of the law with social change required legislative action. Perhaps
judicial decisions helped to influence that action; assessment is difficult.
The principal role of judicial decisions, however, is often the more
limited but still important one of minimizing what might be called
"temporal injustice," that injustice which arises from the lag between
social change and legislative action.
Nonmarital and Marital Relationships
The Family Law Act of 19698 established no-fault divorce in
California and clarified the law of community property. It failed,
however, to define the rights of unmarried cohabitants and thus did
not accomodate the increasing use of contract to structure property and
other rights in both marital and nonmarital relationships and to respond
fully to the demand for total equality between male and female part-
ners. The California Supreme Court r6solved some of the problems
4. See CAL. PENrAL CODE § 314, and In re Smith, 7 Cal. 3d 362, 497 P.2d 807,
102 Cal. Rptr. 335 (1972) interpreting § 314.
5. See former CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 286, 288a (West 1970) (amended 1975).
6. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13202 (West 1970) construed in Sarac v. State Bd.
of Education, 249 Cal. App. 2d 58, 63, 57 Cal. Rptr. 69, 72-73 (1967).
7. See former CAL. CIrv. CODE § 156 (West 1954) (later version at CAL. CIV.
CODE § 5101) (repealed 1973); former CAL. CIrv. CODE § 172 (West 1954) (current
version at CAL. Cirv. CODE § 5125) (West Supp. 1977); former CAL. CIV. CODE §
172a (West 1954) (current version at CAL. Crv. CODE § 5127) (West Supp. 1977).
8. CAL. Civ. CODE §§ 4000-5138 (West 1970 & Supp. 1974).
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which were not treated by the Family Law Act in Marvin v. Marvin9
and In re Marriage of Dawley.10
Unmarried Couples and Property Rights
Marvin v. Marvin was the first supreme court decision to discuss
the contract and property rights of unmarried consorts" since Keene
v. Keene.12  The case achieved public notoriety because the defend-
ant, Lee Marvin, was at the time an actor of considerable repute and
wealth. According to plaintiff Michelle Marvin, she and Lee had
entered into an oral agreement in 1964 to combine their efforts and
earnings and to share equally all property accumulated. They lived
together until 1970. After Lee stopped supporting her in 1971, Mi-
chelle sued for half of the property acquired during the six-year period.
The trial court granted judgment on the pleadings for Lee, apparently
on the ground that the agreement might violate the rights of Betty
Marvin, to whom Lee was legally married until 1968. The court of
appeal affirmed on a much broader ground, holding that the agreement
was void because it was made in contemplation of an illicit relationship.
The court of appeal, relying on the dicta of prior cases that con-
tracts made in contemplation of an illicit relationship are unenforce-
able, took a punitive stance in opposition to changes in social behavior.
The years since cases like Keene v. Keene had seen a great increase
in the number of nonmarital living situations,' 3 a growing social ac-
ceptance of such relationships, and the rise of a new moral imperative,
claiming equal rights for women in nonmarital as well as marital re-
9. 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976).
10. 17 Cal. 3d 342, 551 P.2d 323, 131 Cal. Rptr. 3 (1976).
11. The courts are not settled on the label for a nonmarital relationship and the
members of that relationship. Marvin rejects the term "meretricious," which implies
prostitution, and refers to the relationship as a "nonmarital partnership." 18 Cal.
3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976). This term seems overbroad, for
example, because it encompasses most law firms which are literally "nonmarital part-
nerships." This writer prefers the term "nonmarital consortium," referring to the mem-
bers as "consorts."
12. 57 Cal. 2d 657, 371 P.2d 329, 21 Cal. Rptr. 593 (1962). In Keene, the
court held that a woman who contributed services to a farming operation during the
course of a nonmarital consortium was not entitled to any interest in the ranch prop-
erty which was held in the name of her consort. Id.
13. Justice Tobriner observed that "many young couples live together without
the solemnization of marriage, in order to make sure that they can successfully later
undertake marriage. This trial period . . .serves as some assurance that the marriage
will not subsequently end in dissolution to the harm of both parties. We are aware
• .. [also] of the pervasiveness of nonmarital relationships in other situations." 18
Cal. 3d at 683, 557 P.2d at 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
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lationships. Viewed in the light of these developments, the moral
premises of the court of appeal decision yielded an immoral result:
persons who lived together without marriage and entered agreements
relating to their property were denied the contract rights of married
persons, with the consequence that one consort, usually the male,
acquired property which was the product of mutual effort.
Justice Tobriner, writing for the supreme court majority in Marvin,
rejected the court of appeal's moralistic approach, stating that "[t]he
mores of society have indeed changed so radically in regard to co-
habitation that we cannot impose a standard based on alleged moral
considerations that have apparently been so widely abandoned by so
many." 14  His opinion began by demonstrating that the past decisions
do not invalidate all contracts which contemplate a nonmarital rela-
tionship. Instead, he construed those decisions to yield a simple and
more limited rule: "So long as the agreement does not rest upon illicit
meretricious consideration, the parties may order their economic affairs
as they choose, and no policy precludes the courts from enforcing such
agreements." 5 In other words, contracts that by their terms violate
the laws against prostitution cannot be enforced, but all other agree-
ments between unmarried consorts may be valid. This objective rule
avoids the difficulty of inquiring into the subjective contemplation of
the parties and serves to protect their reasonable expectation that
agreements will be carried out.16
Because Michelle Marvin's pleadings had alleged an express con-
tract, the court's opinion could have stopped with its holding that such
a contract could form the basis of a cause of action. The arguments
of counsel, however, called the court's attention to a conflict in the
court of appeal opinions concerning the property rights of unmarried
couples. The Court of Appeal for the First District in In re Marriage
of Caryl7 had interpreted the Family Law Act to require that property
acquired during an "actual family relationship" be divided equally,'8
14. Id. at 684, 557 P.2d at 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
15. Id. at 674, 557 P.2d at 116, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 825.
16. The concept of protecting the reasonable expectations of contracting parties
derives from Justice Tobriner's pioneering opinions establishing the principle that con-
tracts of adhesion must be interpreted to cary out the reasonable expectations of the
weaker party. See, e.g., Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 54 Cal.
Rptr. 104 (1966); Steven v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 377 P.2d 284, 27
Cal. Rptr. 172 (1962); Neal v. State Farm Ins. Co., 188 Cal. App. 2d 690, 10 Cal.
Rptr. 781 (1st Dist. 1961).
17. 34 Cal. App. 3d 345, 109 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1st Dist. 1973).
18. Estate of Atherly, 44 Cal. App. 3d 758, 119 Cal. Rptr. 41 (4th Dist. 1975),
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but the Third District in Beckman v. Mayhew'9 bad refused to follow
that precedent. Because the resolution of conflicts between court of
appeal decisions is a principal function of the supreme court, Justice
Tobriner's opinion addressed the question that Cary and Beckman had
been unable to resolve consistently.
Justice Tobriner demonstrated that the holding of the Cary deci-
sion suffered from two defects. First, there was simply no evidence
that the legislature had intended the Family Law Act to govern prop-
erty of unmarried couples.20  Second, many couples who live together
do not marry because they do not want their relationship governed
by the laws applicable to married couples. In effect Cary would have
forced those laws upon them.
21
The court concluded that Cary erred in applying the Family Law
Act to unmarried couples. If it had overruled Cary with nothing to
replace that decision, however, the court's assurance that express con-
tracts would be enforced would have been a giant step backwards.
Virtually all consortiums without express contracts would fall under
the regime of the old and inequitable precedents which gave all prop-
erty to the consort in whose name title was taken. If Cary was to go,
legal principles had to be set out to govern those situations in which
the parties intend an equal division of property and act in reliance
upon this tacit understanding but never put that understanding into
an express agreement. Therefore the Marvin opinion next held that
unmarried consorts can assert rights based on theories of implied con-
tract or quantum meruit and can resort to established equitable reme-
dies. Recognizing the changing needs of society, Justice Tobriner
summarized the court's approach:
We conclude that the judicial barriers that may stand in the
way of a policy based upon the fulfillment of the reasonable ex-
pectations of the parties to a nonmarital relationship should be
removed .... [T]he courts now hold that express agreements
will be enforced unless they rest on an unlawful meretricious con-
followed the holding in In re Marriage of Cary, 34 Cal. App. 3d 345, 109 Cal. Rptr.
862 (1st Dist. 1973).
19. 49 Cal. App. 3d 529, 122 Cal. Rptr. 604 (3d Dist. 1975).
20., See id.; Comment, The Property Rights of Meretricious Spouses, 16 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 783, 800-02 (1976).
21. Of course, under the reasoning of both Cary and Marvin, a valid agreement
between the parties to hold their acquisitions as separate property would be controlling.
In the case of nonmarital consortiums it would seem more reasonable to begin with
the assumption that the parties intended their relationship to be governed by the laws
applicable to unmarried persons and to place the burden on the party asserting the
contrary. Cary would instead impose community property laws unless the objecting
party proved a valid separate property agreement.
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sideration. We add that in the absence of express agreement, the
courts may look to a variety of other remedies in order to protect
the parties' lawful expectations.
2
?
As Justice Clark's dissent pointed out, Marvin leaves some unset-
tled questions.23  Two are of particular importance. Marvin visual-
izes an equal, emancipated relationship between man and woman, with
property rights based on express or tacit agreement. When unmarried
couples instead enter into a traditional living arrangement with only
one earning consort and make no agreement, express or implied, the
question arises whether anything can be done to protect the expecta-
tions of the consort who stays home. The court in Marvin deferred
resolution of this complex issue to a later date because it had not been
thoroughly argued.
2 4
The second question raised concerns the application of Marvin
to gay couples. The facts of the case and the arguments of counsel
did not address the issue. The respect shown in Marvin for the rights
of individuals to choose their own way of life and to order their affairs
by private contract, free from state enforcement of patterns of orthodox
behavior, intimates, however, that agreements between gay couples
would be enforced.
Married Couples and Contract Rights
Shortly after hearing argument in Marvin v. Marvin, the court
granted a hearing in the case of In re Marriage of Dawley.25 That
case presented issues philosophically similar to Marvin but involved
a lawful, if temporary, marriage. Under the pressure of an unplanned
pregnancy, the Dawleys decided to marry for at least fourteen months.
Prior to the marriage they entered into an agreement providing that
the earnings of each would remain the separate property of that spouse.
When they separated eight years later, the husband sued to enforce
the antenuptial agreement. Relying on a dictum from In re Marriage
of Higgason,28 that an antenuptial agreement "must be made in con-
22. Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 684, 557 P.2d 106, 122, 134 Cal. Rptr.
815, 831 (1976).
23. Id. at 685-86, 557 P.2d at 123-24, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 832-33.
24. The court states, "Our opinion does not preclude evolution of additional
equitable remedies to protect the expectations of the parties to a nonmarital relation-
ship in cases in which existing remedies prove inadequate; the suitability of such
remedies may be determined in later cases in light of the factual setting in which they
arise." Id. at 684 n.25, 537 P.2d at 123, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 832.
25. 17 Cal. 3d 342, 551 P.2d 323, 131 Cal. Rptr. 3 (1976).
26. 10 Cal. 3d 476, 485, 516 P.2d 289, 295, 110 Cal. Rptr. 897, 903 (1973).
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templation that the marriage relation will continue until the parties
are separated by death," the court of appeal refused to enforce the
agreement on the ground that it contemplated a temporary marriage.
As in Marvin, the court found that the moral values barring en-
forcement of the agreement were inapplicable to changed social con-
ditions and that a narrow interpretation of past decisions would be
more consistent with modern practice. The opinion notes:
An increasing number of couples have executed antenuptial agree-
ments in order to structure their relationship in a manner more
suited to their needs and values. Neither the reordering of prop-
erty rights to fit the needs and desires of the couple, nor realis-
tic planning that takes account of the possibility of dissolution,
offends the public policy .... 27
Only those contracts are barred by the Dawley decision that by their
terms promote and encourage dissolution - a limitation comparable
in its narrow scope to the contracts for prostitution held unenforceable
in Marvin. The result, once again, is a victory for individuality and
for the rights of couples to make and enforce their own agreements
without being confined by conventional attitudes toward community
property rights.
The California Supreme Court failed, however, to respond to
another serious defect in the Family Law Act, the Act's perpetuation
of the husband's superior rights in the management of community
assets. The issue arose in Marks v. Superior Court,28 a petition for
hearing that challenged the constitutionality of California Civil Code
section 5125, which then provided that "the husband has the manage-
ment and control of community personal property, with like absolute
power of disposition, other than testamentary, as he has of his separate
estate."29  Although California constitutional law holds that statutes
which discriminate on the basis of gender are invalid unless supported
by a compelling state interest, 0 a hurdle that section 5125 plainly
27. 17 Cal. 3d at 358, 551 P.2d at 333, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 13.
28. 1 Civ. No. 33323 (1973).
29. CAL. Civ. CODE § 5125 (West Supp. 1977).
30. Sail'er Inn v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 17-18, 485 P.2d 529, 539-40, 95 Cal. Rptr.
329, 339-40 (1971). When the court held in Sail'er Inn that sex discrimination re-
quired strict judicial scrutiny, it may not have fully appreciated the implications of
that holding. Sail'er Inn implies the unconstitutionality of the husband's control of
community property and his choice of the family abode, the preference for the mother
in custody cases, school hair and grooming requirements that differentiate between
sexes, job classifications and tests that bear unequally on the sexes, and many other
laws and regulations. Although the court has never rejected the holding of Sail'er
Inn, it has been noticeably reluctant to grant hearings in those cases which challenge
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could not surmount, the court denied a hearing.31 The following
year the legislature amended the Family Law Act to abolish the hus-
band's priority in management of community property, thus rectifying
this atavism.
3 2
In sum, the court, largely through the opinions of Justice Tobriner,
and the legislature have transformed California law respecting the
property rights of married and unmarried couples. The law now rests
on two principles: the equality of the partners, regardless of sex, and
the right of the partnership to order its own economic affairs.
Adult Sexual Behavior and the Law
An enormous gulf existed between human sexual practices and the
laws relating to victimless sex crimes as they existed before 1976.33
Studies have indicated that the majority of adults have engaged in
oral copulation and that a substantial minority have practiced sod-
omy. 4 Yet until recently, the law imposed a maximum term of fifteen
years for the former3 5 offense and life for the latter.36  These laws
refused to recognize the reality of the homosexual community.
Retroactive Application of Legislative Reform
The ugly spectre of laws designed to impose a narrow and obsolete
view of sexual behavior upon a nonconforming majority, with calami-
laws or regulations which presumably would fail to measure up to the strict scrutiny
standard.
31. California Supreme Court Minutes of August 8, 1973.
32. See CAL. Civ. CoDE § 5125 (West Supp. 1977). The court, however, has
greatly extended the rights of the nonworkinrg spouse in a series of decisions involving
pension funds. Although pension rights have become an important family asset, often
the principal source of retirement income, cases before 1970 denied the nonworking
spouse any interest in nonvested pension rights and left uncertain their interests in
vested rights. In a series of decisions, written principally by Justice Tobriner, the
court established that vested pension rights were community property in Phillipson v.
Board of Adm'n, 3 Cal. 3d 32, 473 P.2d 765, 89 Cal. Rptr. 61 (1970); that such
rights could not be defeated by assertion of a condition within the sole control of
one's spouse, Waite v.-Waite, 6 Cal. 3d 461, 492 P.2d 13, 99 Cal. Rptr. 325 (1972);
that military pensions were also community property, In re Marriage of Fithian, 10
Cal. 3d 592, 517 P.2d 449, 111 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1974); and finally, overruling past
authority, that even nonvested pension rights were a community asset, In re Marriage
of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976).
33. See Willemsen, Sex and the School Teacher, 14 SArA CLARA L. REv. 839,
844-46 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Willemsen].
34. See M. HurNT, SEXuAL BEHAvIoR xN THE 1970's 34-36 (1974).
35. See former CAL. PENAL CoDE § 288a (West 1970) (amended 1975).
36. See former CAL. PENAL CoDE § 286 (West 1970) (amended 1975).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
tous effect upon the occasional person who was caught, disappeared
as a result of legislative action in 1975. 37  Once this action was taken,
the court was able to provide a postscript to the legislative reform with
its decision in People v. Rossi.38 Mrs. Rossi had engaged in oral copu-
lation during the filming of movies intended for public distribution
but never distributed. She was convicted in 1973 of violating former
section 288a of the Penal Code. 39  The trial judge then ordered her
committed for a ninety day psychological observation, an astonishing
use of judicial power because there was no reason to believe her con-
duct was symptomatic of mental illness. The supreme court, however,
denied her petition for habeas corpus. 40  Her direct appeal fared bet-
ter, however, because the new legislation took effect while her case
was pending before the court of appeal.
In affirming the conviction, the court of appeal reasoned that
because the legislature had expressly provided that the new legislation
would not be retroactive for purposes of avoiding the effect of certain
education code provisions, it was not retroactive at all. The supreme
court rejected this non sequitur and reversed the conviction. The
opinion by Justice Tobriner relied heavily upon the precedent of In re
Estrada,41 which held that a statute that reduced punishment bene-
fitted all defendants whose cases were pending on appeal.
42
Rossi illustrates the conceptual problems that can sometimes
stand in the way of a just and sensible result. Estrada, the leading
precedent, differed from Rossi in that it involved a statute that miti-
gated punishment instead of repealing the substantive offense. Justice
Peters' opinion in Estrada stated that when the prohibition against ex
post facto laws is not applicable and the court is faced with a choice
between a greater or a lesser punishment, it could choose the lesser,
but the opinion implied that the court could not totally prevent the
punishment of an offender convicted under a prior law. Justice To-
briner's opinion pointed out that this distinction would yield the absurd
result that had the legislature reduced Rossi's crime to an infraction
subject to a ten dollar fine, she could avail herself of the new law, but
because it made her conduct legal, she was subject to fifteen years
imprisonment. Rejecting this absurdity, the court held that the miti-
37. Cal. Stat. 1975, ch. 71, § 10, at 134; Cal. Stat. 1975, ch. 877, § 2, at 1958.
38. 18 Cal. 3d 295, 555 P.2d 1313, 134 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1976).
39. CAL. PENAL CODE § 288a (West 1970) (amended 1975).
40. California Supreme Court Minutes of April 4, 1973.
41. 63 Cal. 2d 740, 408 P.2d 948, 48 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1965).
42. 18 Cal. 3d at 304, 555 P.2d at 1318, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 69.
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gation or repeal of a criminal statute benefits those whose cases are
pending appeal.
Collateral Consequences of Sexual Behavior
Although it did little to nullify the laws against unconventional
sexual behavior, the supreme court, and Justice Tobriner in particu-
lar, played a very significant role in ameliorating the collateral con-
sequences of such behavior. In Lerner v. Los Angeles City Board of
Education,43 written by Justice Tobriner shortly after his supreme court
appointment, the court made it possible for a teacher convicted of a
homosexual act to regain a teaching credential. The state and city
school boards had revoked Lerner's credential, but judicial decision
later established that the statute authorizing revocation could not be
applied retroactively to conduct, such as Lerer's, that occurred before
its enactment.44 The state board then restored Lerner's credential,
but the city board refused to do so. The issue before the supreme
court was solely a procedural one: whether Lerner's mandamus action
against the city board was barred by the statute of limitations or laches.
Concluding that Lerner's delay in filing suit until after the state board
restored his credential was reasonable, the court held the action timely.
The case features no broad issues or sweeping reform, but it exempli-
fies Justice Tobriner's mastery of technical legal argument to achieve
a desired result.
Far more significant is Justice Tobriner's 1969 opinion in Morrison
v. State Board of Education.45  Morrison had engaged in noncriminal
homosexual acts with another teacher. Acting under Education Code
section 13202, which authorized the revocation of a teaching credential
for "inmoral or unprofessional conduct,"" the State Board of Educa-
tion revoked Morrison's credential.
On appeal to the supreme court Morrison contended that section
13202 was unconstitutionally vague. He argued also that the section
barred him from practicing a lawful profession for reasons unrelated
to his fitness to perform the duties and responsibilities of that pro-
fession and thus denied him due process of law. Justice Tobriner's
opinion acknowledged the abstract merit of both contentions but
43. 59 Cal. 2d 382, 380 P.2d 97, 29 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1963).
44. Fountain v. State Bd. of Educ., 157 Cal. App. 2d 463, 320 P.2d 899 (2d
Dist. 1958).
45. 1 Cal. 3d 214, 461 P.2d 375, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1969).
46. Cal. Stat. 1959, ch. 2, § 13202, at 920 (current version at CAL. EDuc. CODE
§§ 44421, 87331 (West Supp. 1976).
avoided holding the statute unconstitutional by construing it to permit
revocation of a teaching credential only upon a showing that the holder
is unfit to teach. That construction in itself is not a significant im-
provement, for as United States Supreme Court decisions of the 1950's
illustrate, the concept of "unfitness" can be used to bar the noncon-
formist on the theory that employment of such persons will "impair
the integrity of the schools."4 7 Justice Tobriner, however, interpreted
the concept of "unfitness" to be tied to specific and objective criteria.
A teacher is unfit, he explained, only if he "poses a significant danger
of harm to either students, school employees, or others who might be
affected by his actions as a teacher.."4 8  This construction provides
substantial protection for the nonconformist, whether the nonconform-
ity concerns sexuality or some other characteristic. Unfitness now
becomes an empirical question. The old, seldom articulated notion
that all homosexuals are child molesters will not support revocation
of a teaching credential. Essential factual premises must be sup-
ported by evidence, preferably expert psychological evidence con-
cerning the significance of deviant sexual behavior or secondarily,
facts which are so well established that they are a proper subject for
judicial notice. Because in Morrison the record contained no such
evidence as to the significance and implications of Morrison's conduct,
the supreme court reversed the judgment against him.
49
In sum, Morrison established two propositions of great impor-
tance: first, that a person may be barred from practicing a lawful
profession only if he is unfit to do so, and second, that unfitness is
to be proved not by vague and unsupported prejudices but by evidence
which reliably predicts behavioral consequences. Eight years after
Morrison the fight to protect and enforce those propositions continues.50
The belief that persons who commit unorthodox sexual acts somehow
contaminate a school system remains a strong one 5' and has led to a
47. See Beilan v. Bd. of Educ., 357 U.S. 399 (1958); Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342
U.S. 485 (1952).
48. 1 Cal. 3d at 235, 461 P.2d at 391, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 191.
49. The opinion notes that "[i]n this case, despite the quantity and quality of
information available about human sexual behavior, the record contains no such evi-
dence as to the significance and implications of the . . . incident. Neither this court
nor the superior court is authorized to rectify this failure by uninformed speculation
or conjecture as to petitioner's future conduct." 1 Cal. 3d at 237, 461 P.2d at 392-
93, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 192-93.
50. See notes 64-76 & accompanying text infra.
51. The Washington Supreme Court recently held that proof that a teacher was
a known homosexual was sufficient proof of his unfitness. Gaylord v. Tacoma School
Dist. No. 10, __ Wash. 2d -, 559 P.2d 1340 (1977). The court's decision in
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number of court of appeal decisions that, although citing Morrison,
limit or evade that decision in a manner quite out of harmony with
the views that inspired it.5 2  Nonetheless, Morrison remains the land-
mark decision in California and the nation establishing that "the power
of the state to regulate professions and conditions of government em-
ployment must not arbitrarily impair the right of the individual to live
his private life, apart from his job, as he deems fit."53
In addition to the legal principles it establishes, Morrison is an
interesting example of Justice Tobriner's judicial technique. In Mor-
rison, Justice Tobriner resolved the constitutional issue by construing
a borderline statute to conform to constitutional principles, a technique
that he employs frequently5 4  This technique has several advantages
over the alternative of declaring the statute unconstitutional: it permits
exposition and enforcement of constitutional principles while avoiding
a direct confrontation between the legislative and judicial branches;
it enables a court to buttress its opinion with the presumption in favor
of a statute's validity instead of having to overcome the presumption
of constitutionality; and it avoids creating a hiatus in the legislative
scheme that might result from striking down an enactment. These
advantages are particularly significant in close cases. Morrison, a
four to three decision, might well have gone the other way had the
majority proposed to strike down Education Code section 13202 and
leave the State Board without statutory authority to revoke credentials
even for conduct which demonstrated unfitness to teach.
The teacher's appeal in Pettit v. State Board of Education55 re-
turned the court to the issues it had considered in Morrison. Mrs.
Pettit, a teacher of mentally retarded elementary school children, be-
longed to a swingers club. At a club party she engaged in sexual acts
effect tells homosexual teachers to "get back in the closet," to conceal their sexual
orientation on pain of discharge.
52. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Millette, 62 Cal. App. 3d 614, 133 Cal. Rptr.
Bd. of Educ., 22 Cal. App. 3d 988, 101 Cal. Rptr. 86 (2d Dist. 1972); contra, Vielehr
v. State Personnel Bd., 32 Cal. App. 3d 187, 107 Cal. Rptr. 852 (5th Dist. 1973);
Comings v. State Bd. of Educ., 23 CaL App. 3d 94, 100 Cal. Rptr. 73 (1st Dist. 1972).
See also, Note, The Good Moral Character of California Administrative Agencies - A
Study of the Good Moral Character Requirement, 5 U. CAL. D.L. REv. 84, 98-101
(1972), which criticizes the limiting language of some of the court of appeal decisions
filed in 1970 through 1972.
53. 1 Cal. 3d at 239, 461 P.2d at 394, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 194.
54. See, e.g., Braxton v. Mun. Ct., 10 Cal. 3d 138, 514 P.2d 697, 109 Cal. Rptr.
897 (1973); San Francisco Unified School Dist. v. Johnson, 3 Cal. 3d 937, 479 P.2d
669, 92 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1971); In re Kay, 1 Cal. 3d 930, 464 P.2d 142, 83 Cal. Rptr.
686 (1970).
55. 10 Cal. 3d 29, 513 P.2d 889, 109 Cal. Rptr. 665 (1973).
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with three men in view of an undercover police agent. Charged with
a violation of then existing Penal Code section 288a,5 6 a conviction of
which would have resulted in automatic revocation of her teaching
credential, she pled guilty to the lesser offense of outraging public
decency. The State Board of Education then initiated revocation pro-
ceedings against her under Education Code section 13202, the statute
construed in Morrison.
Although upholding the revocation, the majority did not overrule
Morrison. Rather, Justice Burke for the majority accepted Morrison's
holding that a teaching credential could be revoked only for unfitness
to teach but distinguished Morrison on three grounds: Pettit's sexual
activities violated criminal statutes, 57 they occurred in a "semi-public
setting," and expert witnesses testified that she was unfit to teach.
None of the suggested distinctions can withstand analysis. The real
distinction between Morrison and Pettit is that the replacement of
Justice Peters and Chief Justice Traynor by more conservative justices
swung the balance in favor of the Morrison dissenters. 58
Justice Tobriner, now in dissent, rejected the distinctions advanced
in the majority opinion. Conviction of a crime, he pointed out, "has
no talismanic significance." 59  No one would suggest that the com-
mission of a traffic offense, for example, would result in the disbarment
of an attorney or the disqualification of a teacher. The semipublic
place in which Pettit's acts occurred was the bedroom of a private
home, and the viewers were persons who had certified in writing their
56. CAL. PENAL CODE § 288a (West 1970) (amended 1976).
57. CAL. PENAL CODE § 650 1/2 (West 1970). The majority decision equivo-
cates on the significance of the criminal conviction. Although in text it distinguishes
Morrison on the ground that Pettit's conduct was criminal, in a footnote it rejects as
irrelevant her contention that the criminal statutes in question were unconstitutional
on the ground that "the sole question presented herein is whether the record contains
sufficient evidence to sustain the trial court's determination that plaintiff's conduct
rendered her unfit to teach." 10 Cal. 3d at 33 n.4, 513 P.2d at 892, 109 Cal. Rptr.
at 668. Numerous law review commentaries on Pettit have emphasized that proof
that conduct is criminal does not vitiate the Morrison standard but simply constitutes
one factor which may be considered in determining whether the person in question
is fit. See Willemsen, supra note 33, at 853; Comment, Unfitness to Teach: Creden-
tial Revocation and Dismissal for Sexual Conduct, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 1442, 1455-57
(1973); Note, The California Supreme Court, Pettit and Disciplinary Proceedings
Against Teachers, 1 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 404 (1974); Comment, Dismissal of a Trans-
sexual from a Tenured Teaching Position in a Public School, 1976 Wisc. L. REv. 670.
58. See Willemsen, supra note 33, at 849.
59. 10 Cal. 3d at 39, 513 P.2d at 896, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 672 (quoting Morrison
v. State Bd. of Educ., 1 Cal. 3d 214, 219 n.4, 461 P.2d 375, 378, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175,
178).
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willingness to view or participate in sexual acts.60 The dissent points
up the fallacy of this distinction:
In essence the majority are saying that even though her fellow"swingers" were not offended, they - the majority - find plaintiff's
behavior shocking and embarrassing. Yet this important issue of
plaintiff's right to teach should not turn on the personal distaste
of judges; the test, as this court has announced in the cases, is the
rational one of the effect of the conduct, if any, on the teacher's
fitness to teach.61
The expert testimony was the only ground that could truly distinguish
this case from Morrison, but it was virtually worthless. One expert
opined that Pettit was unfit because she could not teach "sexual moral-
ity" to her students but admitted on cross-examination that the teach-
ing of sexual morality was not among her duties. Another expressed
the view that anyone who committed an extramarital sex act was
lacking in "clean morals" and hence unfit to teach. A third expert in
effect disqualified himself by admitting that his opinion was affected
by his desire to remain employed by the school board, which would
want him to designate her as unfit.
62
justice Tobriner's dissent exposes the underlying values involved
in the revocation of Pettit's credential. Concerned that competent
and highly skilled teachers such as Mrs. Pettit could be barred from
California schools by a casual determination of unfitness by the State
Board of Education, he noted: "The danger of the majority's decision
becomes especially onerous when we know that a large proportion of
the younger generation do engage in unorthodox sexual activities
deemed anathema by some members of the older generation."
63
Two recent opinions written by Justice Tobriner illustrate his
continuing efforts to protect teachers threatened with the loss of their
livelihood because of sexual acts unrelated to teaching competence.
Newland v. Board of Governors0 4 involved an applicant for a com-
munity college credential who had been convicted seven years earlier
of lewd conduct in a public place, a misdemeanor sex offense.6 5 At
60. See text accompanying note 56 supra.
61. 10 Cal. 3d at 41, 513 P.2d at 897-98, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 673-74.
62. Id. at 41-42, 513 P.2d at 898, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 674.
63. Id. at 37-39, 513 P.2d at 894-96, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 670-72.
64. 19 Cal. 3d 705, 566 P.2d 254, 139 Cal. Rptr. 620 (1977).
65. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 647(a) (West 1970). Newland's conduct consisted
of masturbating in a closed toilet booth at a bus station rest room. It is questionable
whether such conduct violated § 647(a), and even more questionable whether the
police observation of that conduct constituted an unlawful search. See People v.
Triggs, 8 Cal. 3d 884, 506 P.2d 232, 106 Cal. Rptr. 408 (1973). Nevertheless New-
land was found guilty of the charge, and did not appeal from his conviction.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
the time Newland applied for his credential, Education Code section
13220.16 prohibited issuance of a community college credential to
anyone convicted of a sex offense as defined in section 12912, including
the offense of lewd conduct in a public place. The Board of Governors
therefore refused to grant Newland a fitness hearing and. denied his
application.
Newland then sued to compel the board to grant him a fitness
hearing, contending that the statutorily mandated rejection of his ap-
plication denied him the equal protection of the law, and rested im-
plicitly upon a conclusive presumption of unfitness which violated
due process of law. While his appeal was pending, the Legislature
amended section 13220.1666 to permit an applicant to obtain a com-
munity college credential, despite a prior conviction of a sex offense,
provided he was found fit to teach and met three conditions. One of
the conditions, however, was that he apply for a certificate of rehabili-
tation, a document available only to convicted felons. Newland, a
misdemeanant, could not fulfill this condition. Thus as Justice To-
briner explained, "the 1976 amendment [worked] the Kafka-like per-
verse effect of providing that a person convicted of a felony sex crime
who applies for a certificate of rehabilitation and who is otherwise
fit, can obtain certification to teach in the community college system
but that an otherwise fit person, convicted of a misdemeanor sex crime,
is forever barred." 7
Avoiding other difficult constitutional issues raised by Newland,
the court reversed on the ground that the amendment's denial of
relief to misdemeanants denied them the equal protection of the law.
The amendment's discrimination in favor of felons and against mis-
demeanants, the court declared, lacked any rational relationship to
the objective of protecting the schools from unsuitable teachers: "The
Legislature could not possibly or sensibly have concluded that mis-
demeanants, as opposed to felons, constitute a class of particularly
incorrigible offenders who are beyond hope of rehabilitation."68
Board of Education v. Jack M.,69 filed the same day as Newland,
involved a tenured teacher who was threatened with dismissal follow-
ing an incident in which he allegedly solicited a homosexual act in a
public restroom. The trial court, finding on conflicting evidence that
the teacher was not unfit to teach, held that the board of education
66. 1976 Cal. Stats., ch. 947.
67. 19 Cal. 3d 705, 712, 566 P.2d 254, 258, 139 Cal. Rptr. 620, 624 (1977)
(emphasis in original).
68. Id. at 712, 566 P.2d at 758, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 624.
69. 19 Cal. 3d 691, 566 P.2d 607, 139 Cal. Rptr. 700 (1977).
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lacked authority to discharge him. The Court of Appeal reversed,
holding that the commission of a public sexual offense demonstrated
unfitness to teach as a matter of law.70
The supreme court granted the teacher's petition for hearing and,
in a unanimous opinion by Justice Tobriner, sustained the trial court.
Justice Tobriner's opinion reaffirmed unequivocally the Morrison stand-
ard of fitness to teach, and classified that question as one of fact, an
issue left open by Morrison.7' Reciting psychological testimony that
the teacher's conduct was an isolated, aberrant act, unlikely to be
repeated, the court concluded that substantial evidence supported the
trial court's finding that the teacher was not unfit to teach.
72
Although both Newland and Jack M. turned on relatively narrow
issues - the language of amended section 13220.16 in Newland, the
substantial evidence rule in Jack M. - these cases take on a broader
significance because of their explicit rejection of arguments which, in
past decisions, have often been employed to justify decisions depriving
teachers of employment or certification. Both Newland and Jack M.
expressly rejected the contention that any person who commits a sex
offense is per se unfit to teach.73  Newland went on to interpret the
amendment to section 13220.16 as legislative recognition that some
persons who committed sex offenses, and were convicted for such
offenses, may nevertheless be rehabilitated and thus fit to teach.
74
lack M. expressly denounced the broader proposition, implicitly re-
jected in Newland, that proof of commission of a criminal act demon-
strates unfitness as a matter of law. 75  Finally, Jack M. limited the
force of the frequently used arguments that a teacher who committed
some unorthodox sexual act is necessarily unfit because he cannot serve
as a suitable exemplar for his students, or because he cannot instruct
them in manners and morals. Such arguments, the opinion explains,
are merely possible inferences arising from the evidence which the
trial court is free to reject.
76
These decisions, from Lerner and Morrison through Newland
and Jack M. demonstrate that the guidance of Justice Tobriner has
70. 133 Cal. Rptr. 275 (2d Dist. 1976).
71. See Morrison v. Board of Educ., 1 Cal. 3d 214, 238, 461 P.2d 375, 393, 82
Cal. Rptr. 175, 193 (1973).
72. 19 Cal. 3d 691, 698, 566 P.2d 602, 605, 139 Cal. Rptr. 700, 703 (1977).
73. Newland v. Board of Governors, 19 Cal. 3d 705, 711, 566 P.2d 254, 259, 139
Cal. Rptr. 620, 625 (1977); Board of Educ. v. Jack M., 19 Cal. 3d 691, 702, 566
P.2d 602, 609, 139 Cal. Rptr. 700, 707 (1977).
74. 19 Cal. 3d at 712, 566 P.2d at 258, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 624.
75. Id. at 702, 566 P.2d at 609, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 707.
76. Id. at 699, 566 P.2d at 606, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 704.
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given the California Supreme Court impetus to take the lead in over-
turning the notion that sexual orthodoxy and conformity are proper
conditions for employment in the public service generally or in the
teaching profession in particular. Unfitness to practice, the opinions
hold, is the only proper ground for barring a person from pursuing his
chosen profession; such unfitness is an individual, empirical question,
not an issue to be resolved by social stereotypes.
Sex Oriented Expression
Defining Protected Expression
Several of Justice Tobriner's opinions have contributed signifi-
cantly to the establishment of a pattern of tolerance toward sex ori-
ented expression that still prevails.77 Zeitlin v. Arnebergh,78 the most
important of these decisions, protected Henry Miller's Tropic of Cancer
from suppression as obscene. In holding that Tropic of Cancer was
not obscene, Justice Tobriner set out his views of the relationship
between the law and artistic creativity:
[A] legal proscription cannot... constrict artistic creation. Man's
drive for self-expression, which over the centuries has built his
monuments, does not stay within set bounds; the creations which
yesterday were the detested and the obscene become the classics
of today. The quicksilver of creativity will not be solidified by
legal pronouncement; it will necessarily flow into new and some-
times frightening fields. . . . The new forms of expression, even
though formally banned, will, as they always have, remain alive
in man's consciousness. The court-made excommunication, if it
is too wide or if it interferes with true creativity, will be rejected
like incantations of forgotten witch-doctors. Courts must there-
fore move here with utmost caution; they tread in a field where a
lack of restraint can only invite defeat and only impair man's most
precious potentiality: his capacity for self-expression.- 9
Anticipating the later United States Supreme Court decision in
Stanley v. Georgia,s° Justice Tobriner in In re Klorsl held that private
preparation and possession of obscenity is not a crime. In People v.
77. In re Giannini, 69 Cal. 2d 563, 446 P.2d 535, 72 Cal. Rptr. 655 (1968),
cert. denied 395 U.S. 910 (1968), reo'd sub. nom. Crownover v. Musick, 9 Cal. 3d
405 (1973); People v. Noroff, 67 Cal. 2d 791, 433 P.2d 479, 63 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1967);
In re Klor, 64 Cal. 2d 816, 415 P.2d 791, 51 Cal. Rptr. 903 (1966); Zeitlin v. Arne-
bergh, 59 Cal. 2d 901, 383 P.2d 152, 31 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1963).
78. 59 Cal. 2d 901, 383 P.2d 152, 31 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1963).
79. Id. at 922-23, 383 P.2d at 166, 31 Cal. Rptr. at 814.
80. 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (viewing obscene material in the privacy of one's own
home is constitutionally protected).
81. 64 Cal. 2d 816, 415 P.2d 791, 51 Cal. Rptr. 903 (1966).
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Noroif82 he turned to the subject of pictorial expression and held that
"representation of the nude human form in a nonsexual context is
not obscene." 3  Finally, in In re Giannini,8 4 a case involving topless
dancing in a nightclub, Justice Tobriner reviewed the dance as an art
form and held that the first amendment barred suppression of non-
obscene dances before an audience.
The most notable feature of the Giannini opinion - a feature which
survived the later overruling of Giannini in Crownover v. Musick85 -
was its holding that the community standard by which obscenity is
judged is the standard of the state as a whole. As we have witnessed
in recent federal prosecutions, 6 a rule relying on local community
standards allows the attitudes of the most benighted community to
determine what books, magazines, or movies can safely be distributed.
Giannini's statewide standard steers clear of that danger for California
prosecutions.
In the 1970's, the California Supreme Court refused to extend the
earlier decisions of Justice Tobriner and even retreated by disapproving
the holding in Giannini that full first amendment freedoms protect non-
obscene communicative dance. Justice Tobriner accordingly found
himself in dissent. In People v. Luros87 he advanced the view, later
advocated by the liberal minority on the United States Supreme
Court,88 that the state's only legitimate purpose in regulating obscenity
was the protection of children and unwilling viewers. Subsequently,
when a majority of the California Supreme Court held that the defini-
tion of obscenity in Penal Code section 311.2(a) complied with the
specificity requirements of Miller v. California,8" Justice Tobriner took
the opportunity to elaborate on the view he expressed in his Luros
82. 67 Cal. 2d 791, 433 P.2d 479, 63 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1967).
83. Id. at 797, 433 P.2d at 483, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 579.
84. 69 Cal. 2d 563, 446 P.2d 535, 72 Cal. Rptr. 655 (1968).
85. 9 Cal. 3d 405, 509 P.2d 497, 107 Cal. Rptr. 681 (1973).
86. The federal government prosecuted Harry Reems, an actor in the film, Deep
Throat, in Memphis, Tennessee; Al Goldstein, publisher of Screw magazine, in Topeka,
Kansas; and Larry Flynt, publisher of Hustler magazine, in Cincinnati, Ohio. In each
of these cases venue appears to have been selected by the prosecution not because
that district had the closest relationship to the defendant's activities but because it
had conservative community standards and would probably produce a jury hostile to
the defendant.
87. 4 Cal. 3d 84, 480 P.2d 633, 92 Cal. Rptr. 833 (1971), cert. denied 404 U.S.
824 (1971).
88. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 103-07 (1973) (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
89. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
dissent.90 The statutory definition of obscenity, he pointed out, re-
quires the jury to determine a unitary community standard although
in fact Californians entertain a broad range of views on that subject.
Thus the process of determining and applying community standards
is an extremely subjective one, and the outcome in any given case is
so problematic that an author or seller cannot predict which works are
and which are not protected. Beyond the problems arising from the
vagueness of the statutory test, the fundamental problem with obscen-
ity laws, he reiterated, is that the state has no legitimate interest in
suppressing erotic communication to consenting adults because the
"right to receive information and ideas, regardless of their social worth
.. is fundamental to our free society."91
Justice Tobriner also dissented from the court's decision in Crown-
over v. Musick,9 2 in which the majority, overruling In re Giannini,
93
upheld the constitutionality of ordinances banning nude dancing and
performances. Distinguishing between speech that is protected under
the first amendment and conduct, which cannot claim that shield, the
90. Bloom v. Mun. Ct., 16 Cal. 3d 71, 545 P.2d 229, 127 Cal. Rptr. 317 (1976).
91. 16 Cal. 3d at 99, 545 P.2d at 244, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 332 (quoting Stanley
v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969)).
92. 9 Cal. 3d 405, 509 P.2d 497, 107 Cal. Rptr. 681 (1973). The decision in
Crownover was complicated by the problem of interpreting the United States Supreme
Court decision in California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972), which upheld a regula-
tion of the California Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control prohibiting nude
dancing in bars. Justice Rehnquist's emphasis on the sweeping authority of states to
regulate sale of alcoholic beverages under the twenty-first amendment appears at times
to suggest that the twenty-first amendment amended the first and fourteenth amend-
ments and thus authorized the state to abridge freedom of speech in connection with
the sale of alcoholic beverages. Such emphasis seems to indicate that a prohibition
of nude dancing might be unconstitutional if applied to an establishment which did
not sell alcoholic beverages. The Crownover majority, however, distinguished LaRue
on the ground that the only language potentially applicable to the case at bar con-
cerned regulation of motion pictures and theatrical performances. 9 Cal. 3d at 428
n.15, 509 P.2d at 512, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 696.
The Supreme Court's later decision in Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922
(1975), suggests that the distinction drawn by the Crownover majority is too narrow.
Doran involved an ordinance which prohibited nudity in any public place. Noting
that the ordinance was not limited to places dispensing alcoholic beverages, the Court
held that the lower court had not abused its discretion in granting a preliminary in-
junction restraining enforcement of the ordinance.
In Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), the Supreme Court wrote the latest chap-
ter of this story, holding that the twenty-first amendment does not validate classifica-
tions which offend the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Although
Craig v. Boren does not overrule California v. LaRue, the gulf separating the views
of Justice Brennan, writing the plurality opinion in Craig, and Justice Rehnquist in
LaRue respecting the role of the twenty-first amendment is beyond reconciliation.
93. 69 Cal. 2d 563, 446 P.2d 535, 72 Cal. Rptr. 655 (1968).
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majority concluded that dancing is a mixture of speech and conduct
and is thus not entitled to a full measure of protection under the first
amendment, even if not obscene by constitutional standards. Justice
Tobriner's dissent points out the danger that can arise from such an
attempt to dichotomize communicative acts into separate components
of speech and conduct:
The adoption of this theory would let the censor loose without
constitutional restriction to condemn at will any and all communi-
cative entertainment. While avoiding reference to the actor's
speech, the state could ban his gestures, his costuming (or amount
of costuming), the positioning of the actors, the lighting of the
stage, or whatever other "conduct" it chooses.
94
A recent obscenity case, People ex rel Busch v. Projection Room
Theater,95 held that sale or exhibition of obscene books or movies could
be suppressed as a public nuisance. Justice Tobriner again was forced
to dissent. His argument, by now a familiar one, emphasized the ab-
sence of a public interest in suppressing communication to consenting
adults.
The patent unworkability and unenforceability of the present ob-
scenity laws may yet lead courts or legislatures to adopt the views that
Justice Tobriner has long advocated. Whether the courts and legis-
latures will eventually arrive at Justice Tobriner's conclusion is de-
batable. Largely through the opinions of Justice Tobriner, however,
much of the danger that serious literary, photographic, or theatrical
works will be chilled by threat of prosecution has been significantly
reduced in California.
Collateral Consequences of Sex Oriented Expression
Expression considered vulgar because of its sexual orientation, as
well as sexual acts previously discussed, can have collateral conse-
quences.9 6  Lindros v. Governing Board97 involved a probationary
teacher who read to his class a short story he had written describing
his emotions while attending the funeral of a black student who died
of a heroin overdose. The story recounted that as he left the funeral,
a young black addressed him as "White-mother-fuckin Pig." The use
of that epithet in the classroom formed the gravamen of the school
district's complaint. The charges led to Lindros' dismissal.
The single use of vulgar language in an appropriate literary
94. 9 Cal. 3d at 436, 509 P.2d at 518, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 702.
95. 17 Cal. 3d 42, 550 P.2d 600, 130 Cal. Rptr. 328 (1976).
96. See notes 43-63 & accompanying text supra.
97. 9 Cal. 3d 524, 510 P.2d 361, 108 Cal. Rptr. 185 (1973).
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context seems insufficient to justify terminating a teacher with a satis-
factory overall record. Apparently, the court's difficulty in overturn-
ing the discharge stemmed from Education Code section 13443(d), 98
which, as interpreted in Griggs v. Board of Trustees,9 provides that
whenever the cause for dismissal relates to the welfare of the schools
and pupils, the courts cannot consider whether the facts justify
dismissal.
Taken literally, the Griggs rule would have permitted the school
board to seize upon any trivial or innocuous event which affected the
school as grounds for discharge. Indeed the board attempted such
a maneuver in the Lindros case, asserting as a second ground for
Lindros' discharge the fact that on one occasion he allowed students
to go to the library without a pass in order to return books needed by
another teacher. Justice Tobriner adroitly avoided this construction
of section 13443 by holding that the only real basis for Lindros' dis-
charge was the reading of "The Funeral." He further held that the
event did not adversely affect the "welfare of the school or the pupils
thereof" and thus did not constitute "cause for dismissal" under section
13443.100
Here, as in Morrison and Pettit, Justice Tobriner reiterated his
belief that competent teachers should not be deprived of their liveli-
hood because a governing authority has been personally offended by
an incident that does not demonstrate unfitness to teach. Expression
characterized as obscene in certain contexts may not be the basis
for dismissal from employment if all the circumstances indicate the
propriety of that usage.
Marijuana
Criminal Sanctions
Another area in which changing social patterns clashed with harsh
penal sanctions was the use of drugs, particularly marijuana. Two
decisions written by Justice Tobriner in the 1960's served to ameliorate
to some extent the undue strictness of the laws. In People v. Woody' 0'
98. CAL. EDuc. CODE § 13443(d) then stated in relevant part that "[t]he gov-
erning board's determination not to reemploy a probationary employee for the ensuing
school year shall be for cause only. The determination of the governing board as to
the sufficiency of the cause pursuant to this section shall be conclusive, but the cause
shall relate solely to the welfare of the schools and the pupils thereof .... .. (Now
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44949(d) (West Supp. 1976)).
99. 61 Cal. 2d 93, 389 P.2d 722, 37 Cal. Rptr. 194 (1964).
100. 9 Cal. 3d at 538-40, 510 P.2d at 370-71, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 194-95.
101. 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
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the court upheld the right of members of the Native American Church
to sacramental use of peyote. In People v. Leal'02 it held that pos-
session of an unusable quantity of a drug does not justify a conviction
for possession.
Subsequent attacks on the drug laws failed, however, because no
justice was willing to adopt the view that the state had no interest in
preventing the ingestion of harmful substances and because arguments
based on freedom of religion usually arose in a context that suggested
that the religious claim was spurious. 08 Beginning in 1974 with an
opinion by former Justice Burke, the court began to strike down some
of the most severe penalties as cruel and unusual punishment,10 4 but
the marijuana laws, perhaps the most vulnerable to such an attack,105
escaped when the legislature reduced the penalty for possession to an
infraction punishable by a fine not to exceed $100.
Collateral Consequences of Marijuana Use
The court did take an active role in ameliorating the collateral
consequences of marijuana convictions when it decided In re Higbie.0
Higbie, a lawyer convicted of failure to pay a federal marijuana trans-
fer tax, faced disbarment. Rejecting the contention that Higbie's
crime necessarily involved moral turpitude, the court observed that
measured by the morals of the day ... [marijuana] possession or
use does not constitute "an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity
.. contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty
between man and man" ... [nor does it] indicate that an attorney
is unable to meet the professional and fiduciary duties of his
practice. 0
7
The court found that Higbie's conduct went beyond the failure to pay
the tax and amounted to a conspiracy with one of his clients to import
102. 64 Cal. 2d 504, 413 P.2d 665, 50 Cal. Rptr. 777 (1968).
103. See, e.g., People v. Mullins, 50 Cal. App. 3d 61, 123 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1st Dist.
1975).
104. See In re Grant, 18 Cal. 3d 1, 533 P.2d 590, 132 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1976) (opin-
ion by Wright, C. J.); In re Foss, 10 Cal. 3d 910, 519 P.2d 1073, 112 Cal. Rptr.
649 (1974) (opinion by Burke, J.).
105. See People v. Rogers, 5 Cal. 3d 129, 140 n.1, 486 P.2d 129, 136, 95 Cal. Rptr.
601, 608 (1971) (dissenting opinion of Mosk, J.) which compares the penalties for
transportation of marijuana with those for various violent crimes.
106. In re Higbie, 6 Cal. 3d 562, 493 P.2d 97, 99 Cal. Rptr. 865 (1972) (opinion
of the court).
107. Id. at 572, 493 P.2d at 103, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 871 (quoting In re Craig, 12
Cal. 2d 93, 97, 82 P.2d 442, 444 (1938)). Craig defined an act of moral turpitude
as one of "baseness, vileness, or depravity... contrary to the accepted and customary
rule of right and duty between man and man." Id.
large quantities of marijuana. Although finding that such conduct
warranted discipline, the court nonetheless concluded that the protec-
tion of the public did not require disbarment. Higbie was suspended
from practice for two years.
Following Higbie, the court of appeal in Comings v. State Boardl10
held that a conviction for possession of marijuana was not in itself
sufficient grounds for revocation of a teaching credential. 109 The issue
of the collateral consequences of a marijuana conviction did not reach
the supreme court again until 1976, when the court granted a hearing
in Governing Board v. Mann.110 While Mann's appeal from a decision
upholding his dismissal was pending, the legislature enacted a new
statute111 designed to eliminate the disproportionately severe criminal
and civil sanctions inflicted on persons convicted of relatively minor
marijuana offenses. This statute expressly prohibited any public entity
from revoking any right on the basis of a pre-1976 marijuana conviction
so long as two years had elapsed from the date of the conviction. The
court, in a unanimous opinion by Justice Tobriner, ruled that the new
statute applied to cases pending on appeal and therefore held that
the school district could not dismiss Mann from his tenured teaching
position.
Thus, as in the case of consensual sex acts, discussed earlier in
this article, legislative action and judicial decisions have combined to
narrow the gap between social attitudes that condone use of marijuana
and laws dating from an earlier era that inflict criminal and civil
punishment upon the user.
Conclusion
Central to the changing social attitudes and practices that have
been discussed is the philosophical concept that each person should
be free to do what he chooses with his life, limited only by the precept
that he cannot interfere with another's rights. Thus limitations im-
posed by traditional orthodoxies, whether moral, religious, or political,
should no longer bind those who choose other modes of living. Ata-
vistic stereotypes of gender, sexual orientation, and the like should not
be permitted to stand in the way of individual fulfillment.
108. 23 Cal. App. 3d 94, 100 Cal. Rptr. 73 (1st Dist. 1972).
109. Vielehr v. State Personnel Bd., 32 Cal. App. 3d 187, 107 Cal. Rptr. 852 (5th
Dist. 1973), held conviction for possession of marijuana to be insufficient to constitute
inability to function as a tax representative trainee and therefore to justify dismissal
of that state employee.
110. 18 Cal. 3d 819, 558 P.2d 1, 135 Cal. Rptr. 526 (1977).
111. CAL. HEALT & SAFETY CODE § 11361.7(b) (West Supp. 1977).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 29
September 1977] TOLERANCE OF EVOLVING LIFESTYLES 97
This philosophy struck a responsive chord with Justice Tobriner,
a man whose actions refute the common assumption that people
become less tolerant as they grow older. Justice Tobriner believes
strongly in the right of each person to achieve individual happiness
and fulfillment, free from unnecessary social and legal barriers. His
receptiveness to new ideas and attitudes and tolerance toward un-
orthodox behavior has significantly influenced the attitudes of the
other justices and shaped the decisions of the court to minimize the
injustice that so often results when the law lags behind evolving social
attitudes.

